Abstract ~ Reciprocal trade agreements, usually known under the generic name of countertrade I'CT) have been traditionally seen as a fiwm of bilateralism, and thus as an inefficient fi~nn of international e,tchange. Although conteml~waD trade theories do not fully explain the increasing prevalence of CT transactions, we will argue that it is l~ssible to conqruct and use a third (hybridl institutional form. which is congruent with the Iransaction-co,;t theories, and we will show how --tinder market imlx'rt'ections --counterlrade can reduce transaction costs while con~rving the efficiency gains generated by these specific arrangements.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reciprocal tr,tdc agrecnzctzts such as coutztertrade represent a particular kitzd of institntiotzal arraflgenlent.
A countcrtradc agreell|ell| has heetz defhtctl as "'an htternathmal comnterei;tl operation in the f'ranlcwork of which the seller has to accept itt partial or total settlctttent of his deliveries the supply of products conting from the purchasing country" (OECD. 1981 ) . In a world where most econotnic transactions involve either an actual or an electronic exchange of money for products, there would seem to be little place for countertradc. "'tile most venerable fiwnl of exchange: a trade of one item for :mother" (tlammond. IgqO, p. 2) . h has been estimated, however, that at least between 10 and 20e,~ of total world mlde may be characterized as reciprocal trade (Hennart and Anderson. 1993, p. 6 ) and this proportion is still growing (Czinkota et al.. 1989, p. 494) , apparently challenging the economic presumption that barter is less efficient than money-for-god,Is transactions.
Not all countries, however, demand compensation under the same circu,nstances: each type ofcountertrade can assume different patterns and is most likely to be motivated by different factors, since countertrade includes contracts of very different kinds, from simple barter to offset transactions. The term countertrade is therefore used to describe a variety of trade practices that can be categorized under two main headings: (I) Barter and barwr-(vpeforms (e.g. switch trading and clearing arrangements): One contract.
no money used and a long-term orientation that involves the swap of one or more products for other g~x)ds of similar value. {2) Other countvrtradeforms, where money or credit are inwdved, such as:
• CounterpurHtase: The exporter undertakes the purchase of goods and services from the country/company concerned. There are two separate contracts, the principal one normally paid for in cash or credit and the second in go~s.
I{13
~Pergamon 0956-5221 (971000 19-9 • Bl/y-Back: A form where the exporter transfers technology. and agrees to purchase in retum sorne 01' the plant" s output over a given nurnher 01' years.
• OJj:~l.'r: The sdler has to agree to subcontract sorne 01' the production to local producers, to increase its imports or to transfer technology. Contemporary trade theories. however. do not fully explain rel'iprocal trade. since until recently the analysis 01' the contracts and institutions that govem it have been neglected (Marin and Schnitzer. 1995. p. I0~9) . Most intemational economists consider countertrade irrational and inefticient. or they see it as the result of govemrnent-imposed restrictions on trade and foreign exchange (see Hennart. 1993 l. In part this explanatory failure results from misconceptions about the different forms of countertrade and the polar question of intemalization of transactions and market contracting. In this paper we shall develop sorne theoretical elements for analysing the decision palh for choosing fomls for international trade. by examining altemalivc contracting forms. and asking ourselves why countertrade was preferred to market contracting or internalization. Two important e1ements in countertrade arrangements. narnely tlexibility. or the adaptive capabilily to switch from one trade or partner to another. and lhe lying of lhe two transactions to create a "hostage" (Williamson. 19S3) . will he lhe key to our analysis.
Following lhis introdm:tory part. and in addilion to a theoretical disl·ussion. the paper lirsl introduces an analysis of lhe economic ralionale for countcrtrad\.'. induding thc asymmclrics of information amI transaetion-cost thcory frameworks. Suhscllucntly. a conceptualmodel analyses countertrade as a hyhrid form helwe\.'n the market mld the hierarchy. ami examines the choice of countertradc as a stratcgic lrading form. The last section thcn providcs a summary and some concluding remarks.
ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR COUNTERTRADE
Among the oldest and most fundamcntalllueslions in economics are those n:g~'rding the use of media 01' exchange in international trans~lctions. Traditional economic theory addresses lhe role ami use of a mcdium of cxchange to avoid lradc friclions and proposes. csscnlially. thal if rnoncy cxisls as a mcans of cxchangc. lhcn harler appears irraliona\. Thcn.:fore. "ironically, whal wc call 'Inlernalional Tradc' is. in mosl insl~lI1ccs, a eash lrans~'clion and 'CounlerlraJe', odJly enough. is whal lrade n:ally I1I1.:ans in csscnce: an exchange of goods WilhoUI lhe use of lhe currcncy" (Hal1UllonJ, 1990, p. 2l. The~lI1alysis of eounlerlraJe has usually bcen eonJucled by means of traJitional economic thcory. albcit hascd on simplificd assumptions of perfc.:et inforrnation*. Economie analysis works in an ilh:alil.cd worlJ whcrc cconomic syslems run smoothly. and dcl'isions reg~lrding economic organil.ation~lrc haseJ on prodm:tion and/or distrihution eosts which can be easily identilied. If economic friction in the form of transaetion costs exisls, then the explanatory power of traditional economic analysis is weakened since real-world situations do not always malch economic predictions.
For such a market to be perfect, most of its members on the buying and selling sides would have to compete knowledgeably, and to do so they would have to assemble all the necessary information. Moreover. this assumption not only simplifies reality but also distorts it. because marketrelevant knowledge is not randomly distributed among market participants, but in most cases is biased in favour of one or the other side. Such a bias has a great impact on market behaviour and trade outcomes, and the resulting relationship is a well-known asymmetrical market situation.* Although reciprocal trade is widely held to be uncompetitive, some authors regard it more favourably. To explain countertrade satisfactorily, the economic motivation for this preference needs to be revealed. An examination of the trading parties" incentives for bypassing money mediation suggests that. as the traditional case against barter was presented in the context of a closed economy, the extension of the argument to international trade implies that all trading partners should have equal access to the media of exchange and information. If this is not so. the theoretical case against barter does not hold up. and we are back to the basic tenet that some alternative form of reciprocal trade will arise. As Stigler (1969. p. 39) pointed out "the case for reciprocity arises when prices cannot be freely varied to meet supply and demand conditions. Here reciprocity restores flexibility of prices".
Reciprocal trade arrangements are often seen as a means of solving foreign exchange shortages when countries~customers have difficulty in obtaining trade credits, and most explanations of countertrade suggested in the descriptive literature ascribe the increasing importance of reciprocal trade to the high indebtedness of countries. Hennart ( 1989. pp. 13 I-I 32) has shown, however. that this is not generally true. and has in arly case limited explanatory power. Perhaps only sinlple barter and barter-like contracts under specific tend;lions have this property, since they luay not involve cash transactions of any kind (Banks. 1¢)83). Other countcrtrade ft)rnlS, such as conlpensation, counterpurchase and buy-back, which represent nlorc than half of all countertrade transactions, tit) not help in solving a country's shortage of hard currency, and ;ire more likely to be motivated by additional l~lctors. 'l" l~nlpirical results (|lenllart. 1990; Caves and Marin, 1992; ||¢nnart and Anderson. 1993 ) suggest that countcrtrade occurs in situations where the superiority of market-mediated transaclions is not well established, either because of asynlnlctric infornlation or imperfect (distorted) competition. For both parties to countertradc there must therel'orc bc compatible economic incentives to forego ordinary market alternatives. [n the absence of these factors, countertrade would perhaps be replaced by money-mediated transactions in the form of commodity trade, forward sales, foreign direct investtnent (FDI) and other fornls of internalization.
hi many (regulated and developing ) econoinies, nlarkct imperfections are the norln and business skills are often scarce, while It)reign exporters face nlany restrictions and a lack of infornlalion on the business environtnent and the quality of goods. We will see that under these circumstances countertrade may lead to transactions that would otherwise not occur. Studies by Hennart (1989) and I-lcnnart and Anderson (1993) . which also focus on transaction costs as a rationale for CT, test the hypothesis that CT is a second-best alternative to direct foreign investluent by h)oking at country data. They find supporting evidence that CT is more frequently used by countries which restrict FDI. Their tests are based on 39 and 84 observations respectively.
*For a more dclaih:d -',pproaeh (L) the problcm.~ derived from quality uncertainty and the .-,.,,ymmclric information of buyer~, and sellers. ,~: Akt:rlof (1970) . "i'Non-price situation.~, like: countcrtradc, can thcrcfor~ assume m~my form~, and consist in elfeting a great varicly of linked Irun~¢lions. including ~:uuranlics and warranties thal combine lhc advantages of added information at a lower in~,uranc~ C[)sl.
For such a market to be~rfect. most of its members on the buying and selling sides would have to compete knowledgeably. and to do so they would have 10 assemble aH the necessary information. Moreover. this assumption not only simplifies reality but a1so distorts it. because marketrelevant knowledge is not randomly distributed among market participants. but in most cases is biased in favour of one or the other side. Such a bias has a great impact on market behaviour and trade outcomes. and the resulting relationship is a well-known asymmetrical market situation. * Although reciproeal trade is widely held to be uncompetitive. some authors regard it more favourably. To explain countertrade satisfactorily. the economic motivation for this preference needs to be revealed. An examination of the trading parties' incentives for bypassing money mediation suggests that, as the traditional case against barter was presented in the context of a c10sed economy. the extension of the argument to intemational trade implies that all trading partners should have equal access to the media of exchange and information. If this is not so. the theoretical case against barter does not hold up. and we are baek to the basic tenet that sorne alternative form 01' reciprocal trade will arise. As Stigler (1969. p. 39) pointed out "the case for reciprocity arises when priees cannut be freely varied to meet supply and demand conditions. Here reciprocity restores tlexibility of prices".
Reciprocal trade arrangements are often seen as a means of solving foreign exchange shortages when countrieslcustomers h¡¡ve difficulty in obtaining tmde credits. and most explanations of countertrade suggested in the descriptive lilerature ascribe the ¡ncreasing importance of reciprocallmde to the high indebtedness 01' countries. Hennart (191\9. pp In many (rcgulated and devclopiog ) ccooomies. market impcrfeclions are the nonn aod business skills are onen scarce. while foreign exporlers face many reslriclions aod a lad 01' informalion 00 the business environment and the qualily 01' goods. We will see that under these cin:urnstanccs counlertrade may lead to transactions Ihat would otherwisc not occur. Studies by Hennart (19X9) aod Hennart and Anderson (1993) . which also focos on Iraosaction cosls as a ralionale for CT. test the hypothesis that CT is a second-besl alternative to direcl forcign investl1\enl by looking at country data. They find supporting cvideoce that CT is more frequently used by countries which restrict FDI. Thcír tesis are based on 3lJ and~4 obscrvalions respcctivcly.
·For a more oelailco apprua~h lolhe prohlems oeriveo frolll (jualily UlIl·c:rt.tinly ano Ihe asymmelric infnrmalion of huyers allo sdkrs. see Akerlnf ( 1970) . tNon-pricc silualiuns. Iike~ounlertraoe. can lherefon: assume many fomls ano consisl in offcring a grcal varicly uf Iinkeo Iransaclions. induoillg guaranlics and warranlics lhal cUlllhinc Ihe aovanlages uf aodeo infomlaliun al a lowc:r insllrancc cosl. Mirus and Yeung (1986) used transaction-cost theories in an attempt to explain reciprocal trade. Defining eountertrade an a "'double coincidence of wants". "'an incentive contract-output with quality dimension" and "'a differentiated product used as an input by the technology supplier", they showed that the lack of foreign exchange wax. at best, a partial and somewhat superficial explanation. The authors concluded that these arrangements did not necessarily imperfections, and resorting to countertrade may be a reflection of the high transaction and search costs faced by a trader when trying to market goods.
Further friction arises when goods are of uncertain quality, and when agents have different information about this quality. In this case some agents will make trade contingent on some information which they cannot observe. This creates an incentive problem, which in turn makes implicit credit arrangements difficult without a medium of exchange. Murrell (1982) used market signalling theory to show that eountertrade could solve problems that arose when the quality of foreign goods was unknown. He concluded that countertrade practices were particularly useful when a country has a poor reputation for quality, and when the information about the specific quality of products, which was important to the buyer, could not be obtained directly (here intermediatc trading companies play a leading role). Predictions were supported by empirical tests based on data from more than 400 contracts.
There are two large areas of theoretical uncertainty surrounding countertrade and other reciprocal trade arrangements which this article will explore. The first in to account for the existence and use of countertrade its an intermediate (hybrid) arrangement. The contemporary theory of the firm emphasizes the cross-subslitutibility of firms and markets as organizational modalities, but it does not easily explain intermetli:tlc organizations.* The second major area of inqniry pursued here is an account of how ct)untertr:ttle agreemenls maintain their economic rents and stability. given the absence of legal-institutional SUl~ports.
3. TllF INSTITtJTI()NAI. FRAMi:.WOI~,K While the modern theory of tlze firm has addressed the dcternzh)ants of the internalization of economic transactions, a salisfactory cxpl:mation of partial interl)alization rein:fins elusive. A possible explanation may be "the diflicnlties one typic:ally finds in confronting ideal types such as markets and hierarchies with the empirical richness of the wide variety of means for organizing transactions" (Collin and Larsson, 1993, p. 7) . Nevertheless, since countertrade arrangements should not become a ealah)gue of imperfect ccnnpetition solutions in international finance and trading systems, the aim of this article is to approach the economic organization of countertrade I'rom a comparative institutional point of view, showing tha! it is possible to construct and use a third (hybrid) institution:d form that is congruent with tran.saction-cost theory, while conserving efficiency gains generated by these specific arrangements.
Since the time of original fornmlation, many criticism have ben levelled at the transaction-cost approaeh.t The recognition tbat markets and hierarchies by no means constitute a mutually exhaustive ,set of institutional fl)rms for governing transactions has generated "numerous attempts to develop alternative contracting fi~rms'" (Collin and Larsson, 1993, p. 5 ).
*Hcnnart (|~93) ha.,, ncvcrlhelcs~ argued t|zat the I~ i~)lc'~, t/rm~, and market c(mlracting, in fact de~cribe extreme and qtfitc rare cases. '~,'ilh n)o,~l t)rganilatitm,, f:dling St+lltc~,hcre l'~twc+t|. "i'Tranxactmn-cosl -'m:,lysis is by no means the only explanathm l'(w the existence of firms. EMcicncy reasons may lead to integration, permitting the re:,li/:.athm of economics of scale or ,,col-,c. Firm.,, m:,y also bc established to exert n)onol~Jly l~V,'cr (Tiroh.'. 19~8~.
Mirus and Yeun;! ¡ 1986 l used transaction-cost theories in an atternpt to explain reciprocal trade. Defining countertrade as a "double coincidence of wants··. "an incentive contract-output with quality dirnension" and "a differentiated product used as an input by the technology supplie{·. they showed that the lack of foreign exchange was. at best. a partial and sornewhat superlicial explanation. The authors concluded that these arrangements did not necessarily irnperfections. and resorting to countertrade may be a retlection of the high transaction and search costs faced by a trader when trying to market goods.
Further friction arises when goods are of uncertain quality. and when agents have different informatíon about this quality. In this case sorne agents will make trade contingent on sorne information which they cannot observe. This creates an incentive problern. which in turo rnakes irnplicit credit arrangements difticult without a mediurn of exchange. Murrell (1982) used market signalling theory to show that countertrade could solve problerns that arose when the quality of foreign goods was unknown. He concluded that countertrade practices were particularly useful when a collntry has a poor repulation for qllality. and when the information aboul the specific qualily of products. whil"h was importanl lo the buyer. could not be obtained din:ctly (here inlermediate trading companies playa leading role). Predictions were supported by empirical tests based on dala from more than 4()() contracts.
Therc are two large arcas of lheoreticalunccrtainty surrounding COllnlertrade and other reciprocal trade arrangemenls which Ihis artide will explore. The first is lo accollnt for the existence and use of cOllntertrade as an inlermediale (hybrid l arrangemenl. The col1lemporary Iheory of the finn emphasil.es Ihe cross-suoslilutioility 01" firms and markels as organil.ationalmodalities. but il does nol easily explain inlermediate org;lI1izalions. * The second major arca of inquiry pursued here is an account of how counlertrade agreemenls mainlain lheir economic rents and slaoility. Since the time of Williamson's ( 11.) 75) original formulation. many criticism have ben levelled at the transaction-cost approach.t The recognilion thal markcts and hicrarchics by no means constitulC a mutually exh;lllstive set 01' inslilulional forms for governing transaclions has gencraled "numeruus ;ltlempls lo devclop alternalive contracling forms" (Collin and Larsson. 1993. p. 5 ).
• ...:nnal1 (I'I'HI has n':\"I:l1h<:l.:" argucd that lh.: Iw.. poks. firms and markct c"lllracting. in fa.:1 des.:ribe e.'lreme amI 4uilc rarc .:ascs. wilh m"sl organi/alions falling sumewhere belween. tTransa.:liun-.:osl analysis is hy no n\l:ans lhe unly explanalion fnr lhe exislen.:e uf firms. Efli.:icn<:y rcasuns may lead IU inlcgraliun. pcrmilling lhe reali/atiun uf e.:onlllllics uf seak ur Sl:llpc. hrms may alsu be cSlahlishcd lo exel1 monopuly powcr (Tirok. I'IXX l. Williamson (1991) , introduced the hybrid as an intermediate form between the market and the hierarchy, which involves regulation, franchising and various forms of long-term contracting. including reciprocal trading.
Unified-governance and market-governance are thus poles on the organizational continuum proposed by the transaction-cost theories, but other organizational hybrids have also been envisaged as middle-points on this continuum t Hennart. 19931 or as a third institutional form, with intermediate characteristics between the market and the hierarchy I Larsson, 1993) . Discreet transactions would then be located at one extreme, while highly centralized hierarchical transactions would be at the other, and hybrid transactions (reciprocal trade and other forms of nonstandard contracting) would be located between them.* Although many hypothetical forms of organization "'never arise or quickly die out, because they combine inconsistent features" (Williamson, 1991, p. 271) , complex arrangements such as joint ventures or countertrade agreements can be explained by invoking imperfect competition. We suggest here that countertrade is not novel, and by no means a mixed case. but that it is a distinct type of institutional arrangement. If this is so. then following Williamson's prescription that organizational forms are determined by a comparison of alternative institutional arrangements. we can say that the decision regarding the organizational form for coordinating international trade involves comparing at least three forms: (i) Market-contracting: (ii) hierarchy and (iii) intermediate forms (such as counterlrade).
In Williamson's perspective, it is this efficiency criterion --the minimization t)l" transaction costs ~ which explains the emergence of a specific governance structure. Transaction-cost analysis entails an assessment of the comparative costs of planning, adapting and monitoring the completion of the task under altern,'ttive governance structures. This approach can be extended in order to include hybrid t'orn,s, but the basic postuhtte remains t*nchanged: the governance structure that finally emerges is the one that ininin)izes transaction costs.
Transaction-cost theory has bccn applied tt) many different btlsincss areas, and in this context appears particularly relevant to the study of the role of countcrtr:tde and other complex trading forms in the international business arena, since producers are likely to bc concerned about the extent of the difficulties and costs inw)lved in selecting, negotiating, managing and controlling intermediaries in servicing foreign markets, which may bc remote and complex (high uncertainty) and which require specialized knowledge and investments (high asset specificity).
Generally. the main determinant taken into account is asset-specificity (the level of uncertainty is assumed in some way). Consequently, agreements are supposed to minimize transaction costs when the degree of asset-specificity is h)cated at an intermediary level. The underlying argument is that countertrade agreements combine some of the advantages of the market (high-powered incentives and less bureaucratic costs than hierarchy, but to a lesser degree than the market alternative) and the one hand. and some of the advantages of hierarchy (in terms of control instruments, reducing opportunism and information flows) on the other. This combination of advantages would be especially appropriate when the asset-specificity is not too high.
Under certain circumstances producers may think that relying on exports could be advantageous in the classical sense (production costs), but prohibitive in terms o1" transaction costs. In Williamson's terms, they might decide to use some kind of reciprocal trade agreement, rather *In his earlier work, William~,on argued that hybrids could be expected to be rather rare. re~,umbling the distribution of real-world organizati~)ns on the continuum of two peak~, divided by a deep. broad valley. Later William,.,on revi~d hi.,, thinking, acknowledging [hal the population cff complex economic organizations was far grealer than he' had earlier thought, and that organizational forms were much more evenly distributed. Williamson ( 1991) , introduced the hybrid as an intermediate form between the market and the hierarchy, which invohes regulation. franchising and various forms of long-term contracting. induding reciprocal trading.
Unified-govemance and market-govemance are thus poies on the organizational continuum proposed by the transaction-cost theories. but other organizational hybrids have also been envisaged as middle-points on this continuum (Hennart. 1993) or as a third institutional form, with intermediate characteristics between the market and the hierarchy (Larsson, 1993) . Discreet transactions would then be located at one extreme, while highly centralized hierarchical transactions would be at the other. and hybrid tr.msactions (reciprocal lrade and olher forms of nonstandard contracting) would be localed between lhem. * Although many hypothetical forrns of organizalion "never arise or quickly die out. because they combine inconsistent fealures" (Williamson, 1991. p. 271 ) . complex arrangements such as joint ventures or countertrade agreements can be explained by invoking imperfect competilion. We suggest here lhal countertrade is not novel. and by no means a rnixed case. but lhal it is a dislinct type of institutional arrangement. If this is so. lhen following Williamson's prescription thal organizational forms are determined by a cornparison 01' aitemalive institutional arrangements.
we can say that the decision regarding the organizational form for coon.linaling inlernational trade involves cornparing at least threc forrns: (i) Market-contracting: (ii) hierarchy and (iii) ¡nterme-diale forms (such as counlertrade).
In Williarnson's perspective. il is lhis efticiency crilerion -the minimization 01' transaction cosls -which explains lhe ernergence 01' a specilic governance slmclure. Transaclion-cost analysis cntails an assessrnenl 01' the comparative cosls 01' planning. ad'lpting amlmonitoring lhe completion of the lask unoer aiternalive govcrnance slruclures. This approach can be eXlended in order to inelude hyorid forms. but lhe oasic poslulale remains lInchanged: lhe governance struclure lhal linally emerges is lhe one lhal minimizes lransaclion cosls.
Transaclion-cosllheory has been applieo lo many differenl ollsiness arcas. ano in this context appcars particularly relevant lo the study of lhe role of Cüllnlerlraoe ano olher complcx trading forrns in the internalional ousiness arena. since prodllcers are likely to oe concerned aoout lhe extent of the difliculties ano costs involved in selecling. negoliating. managing ano conlrolling inlerrneoiaries in servicing foreign rnarkels, which may oe remole and complex (high uncerlainly) ano which relluire specialized knowledge ano investmenls (high asset specilicity).
Genemlly. the main determinant taken into .Iccount is assel-specificily (lhe level 01' uncertainty is assumed in sorne way). Consequently. agreernents are supposed lo minimize transaction cosls when the degree of usset-spccilicity is located al un inlerrnediary level. The underlying argument is lhal counlertrade agreemenls comoine sOl1le of lhe advantages of the market (high-powereo incentives and less bureaucralic costs than hierarchy. but lo a Icsser degree lhan the market alternulive) and the one hand. and sorne of the udvuntages 01' hierarchy (in terms of control instmments, n.:ducing opportunism und informalion tlows) nn the other. This combination of advantages would be especially appropriale when lhe assel-specilicity is not too high.
Under certain circumstances proclucers may think lhal relying on exports could be advanlageous in the c1assic.1I sense (production costs). bul prohibitive in terrns of trunsaclion costs. In Williumson's terms. they might decide to use some kind of reciprocal tracle agreemcnt, rather than internalizing the export function or going to the market (i.e. through intermediaries or trading companies).
One way to deter this is to expand the contracting relationship from unilateral to bilateral exchange. Reciprocal trading, especially when it involves product exchanges, creates credible commitments that are signalled without exposing assets. Both parties understand that the transaction will be continued only if reciprocity is observed. Reciprocity can therefore generate benefits for the governance structure (Williamson. 1983) .
Countertrade agreements have certain features reminiscent of markets, in that the two participating firms continue to conduct discrete exchanges with each other, while maintaining formally independent roles. Nevertheless. certain organization-like features are introduced as well: contractual limits are placed on the terms of the exchange, and overall limitations are set to govern activity with potentially competing firms. Within their areas of respective unilateral authority. the firms utilize their existing internal hierarchies to coordinate performance. A hybrid structure can be expected, when these conditions obtain.
Nevertheless. one importance source of sustainable rents is "'the ability of firms to reduce the costs they experience in organizing both internal and external transactions below those of their rivals" (Hennart. 1994. p. 193) and to this end. costs are minimized when the firm chooses the organizing mode that is most efficient for a given transaction. The n|inimization of transaction costs is thercfl~re a criterion of efficiency which explains the emergence of specific governance structures, i.e. either market or hierarchy, although this approach may be extended to include intermediate hybrid fi~rms. The argument is thus that CT agreements offer prospective advantages over trnilateral trade, if tire resulting exposure of tra,lsaction-specific assets effects a credible conmlitnlelrt arrlolrg tire partners. If such is tile case. we stlggcst that countertrz,de can reduce tr:lnsaction or)Ms.
When strong uncerlainty c,~exists with ;.t high degree of assct-specil'icity, however, it is impossible to specify ex-antc the whtdc set of ctmtingclrt clauses required for executing the the contn, ct (bounded rationality hypothesis). Thus c()nlracts ;ire necessarily incomplete. This in turn generates problems of enl'~)rcement, due tt) (~pportt, nistu ;,,nong tile agents. C(mSetlt,Cnlly longterm incomplete ctmtracting is generally characterized by frequent misnndersta,ldings and conflicts which may lead It) delays, breaktl~)wns or other inalfuxlctions. There are two main situations in which transaction costs are likely to be high:
• When there is signil]cant infornmtion asymmetry between tile parties" • When the market is narrow because of scale econ~)mies, transportation costs or the need to make transactiem-specil'ic investments.
According to Larsson ( 1993, p. 99 ) market contracting involves costs primarily for getting the products to and from the market. Under conditions of hierarchical coordination, on the other hand, such marketing and purchasing costs would be redticed to mere transportation costs, although there would be administrative expenses m addition to the internalization costs that are usually neglected in transaction-cost analysis. In the case of countertrade, however, the main costs are related to the process of negotiation, and to achieving an agreement on a joint structure, as we shall see below.
Two observations reinf~rce the idea that negotiation costs are important in the case of counterlrade (barter) agreements. Firstly, agreements generally take the form of long-term incomplete contracts, which are precisely tho.~e ,suffering from strategic bargaining, conflicts and other malfunctions, according to Williamson. Exhaustive contracting is too flexible and generally leads to than internalizing the export function or going to the market (i.e. through intermediaries or trading companiesl.
One way to deter this is to expaml the contracting relationship from unilateral to bilateral exchange. Reciprocal trading. especially when it involves product exchanges. creates credible commitments that are signalled without exposing assets. Both parties understand that the transaction will be continued only if reeiprocity is observed. Reciproeity can therefore generate benefits for the governance structure (Williamson. 19831- Countertrade agreements have certain features reminiseent of markets. in that the two participating firms continue to conduet discrcte exchanges with eaeh other. while maintaining formally independent roles. Nevertheless. certain organization-like features are introduced as well: contractuallimits are placed on the terms of the exehange. and overalllimitations are set to govern activity with potentially competing firms. Within their arcas of respective unilateral authority. the firms utilize their existing internal hierarchies to coordinate performance. A hybrid structure can be expel.:ted. whcn these conditions obtain.
Nevertheless. one importanee source of sustainable rents is "the ability of firms to reduce the costs they expcrienl.:c in organizing both internal and external transactions below those of their rivals" (Hennart. 1994. p. 193) and to this end. costs are minimized when the firm chooses the organizing mode that is most efficient for a given transaction. lhe minimization of transaction costs is then:fore a lTiterion of cfficil'llL'y whil.:h explains the eml'rgence of specifk governance stnll'tures. i.c. eithcr market or hierarchy. although this appnl<ll.:h may he extended to inc!ude intermediate hyhrid forms. The argument is thus that CT agreements oller prospective advantagcs oVt:r unilateral trade. if the n:sulting exposllre of transm:tion-specific assels effects a I.:redihle commitment .ulIong the p;lrtners. If sudl is Ihe CISC. we sllggest thal countertrade can reduce transaction cosls.
When strong uncertainty coexisls wilh a high degree of assel-spel.:ifil.:ily. however. il is impossihle lo specify ex-ante Ihe whole sl'l of conlingcnt c!;luses rcquired for execuling Ihe the contract (hollnded rationality hypothesisl. Thus contr;u:ts .Ire nel.:essarily inl.:omplete. This in turn generates proh!ClIIs of enforl.:emenl. due to opportunislll alllong the agcnts. Consequenlly longterln ineomplcte contracting is gcnerally characteri/ed hy frcqllent misunderstandings and conllicts whil.:h m.IY !cad to dclays. hre•• kdowns or other lIIalfllnctions. There are two main situations in which transaction costs are Iikcly to he high:
• When therc is signilic'lIlt information aSYlTlmetry hctween the parties:
• When the markct is narrow bccause of scalc econolllies. transportation costs or the need to make transaction-specilic investments.
According lO Larsson ( 1l)l)3. p. l)l)l market eontracting involves costs primarily for getting the products lO and from the market. Under eonditions of hierarchil.:'ll coordination. on the other hand. such marketing and purchasing costs would be reduced to mere transportation costs. although there would be administrative expenses in addition to the internalization costs that are usually neglected in transaction-cosl analysis. In lhe case of counlertrade. however, the m;lÍn costs are rclated lO the process of negolialion. antl lo achieving an agreemenl on ajoint slructure. as we shall see bclow.
Two observalions rcinforce lhe idea thal negoliation cosls are important in lhe case of eounlertrade (harter) agreemenls. firslly. agrcel1lenls generally take the form of long-lerm incomplcle contracls, which arc preciscly those suffering from strategic hargaining, contlicts and other mulfunclions. accon.ling to Williul1lson. Exhaustive conlracling is too tlcxihle and gcnerally leads lo failure. Secondly, if we admit that the length of negotiations represents an acceptable approximation of the e.r-ante costs, then it must be recognized that the latter are especially high: the duration of the negotiations often exceeds one year.* Within countertrade transactions, however, free exchange is at least partly abandoned (perhaps due to concern about opportunism), but so too is total internalization. Rather, the two firms remain independent in their larger missions, but operate a specific pooling of assets through a joint governance structure and share their claim to the resulting residual. For transaction-cost theory the greater challenge is not to show which markets fail and why. but to show why a mix or intermediate stnlctnre (such as countertrade) may do more to minimize transaction costs compared to the alternative forms.
THE MINIMIZATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS
Ifcountertrade dtr:s not appear tt) mitfimiz¢ transaction costs, i.e. it" it is less eMcient than hierarchy or nmrket ct)nlracting, why dt) firms g() in for it? what is the value of such agreements? HOW. in some instances, tit) they compensale for higher transaction costs? The answer is connected with the v:due of having a "hostage" in markets under asymmetric information and possessing the dynanlic elements of countertrade agreements, as a way of attaining future IYccdom of choice in unpredict:lblc or changing environments.
Most failures to expl:,in countertrade may result from a misconception about the forms it may take. Hennart (1980. p. 148) , for instance, argued that the various forms of CT are aggregated both in the()retical discussion and in empirical work. ahhot, gh in fact each one deserves an explanation on it own merits. Countertrade agreements include transactions of very different kinds, some of them with barter-like characteristics such as (i) simple barter, switch trading and clearing arrangements, which may be a response to fi)reign exchange shortages or asymmetric information problems, while (ii) other countertradc forms (e.g. buy-back, counterpurchase and compensation), can be regarded under certain circumstances as a ration:d response to market imperfections --as a second-best option in a second-best world economy.
Although some specific ex-antc transacti(m costs may be high (searching, negotiating), the expost (bonding) effects and the consequences of executing the contract are of chief interest here. The problem in international trade is often that the quality of the goods is either not observed by an outsider, or can only be verified at considerable cost. so that it cannot be specified unambiguously in a contract. The CT contract is designed in such a way that goods serve as deal-specific *The obscr~,.ations come from an cxaminati(~n of .~veral case studies of complex trade agreements by Llerena et uL (1991) . failure. Seeondly. if we admil lhal lhe lenglh of negoltatlOns represents an acceptable approximalion of the ex-ante costs. lhen il musl be reeognized lhat the latter are espeeially high: the duration of lhe negotiations often exceeds one year. * Within countertrade transaetions. however. free exehange is at least partly abandoned (perhaps due lo eoneem aboul opportunism). but so loo is total inlemalization. Rather. the two firms remain independent in their larger missions. bUl operale a specifie pooling 01' assets through a joint govemanee strueture and share lheir c1aim lo the resulting residual. For transaetion-eost theory lhe greater ehallenge is not to show whieh markets fail and why. but lo show why a mix or intermediate strueture (such as counlertrade) may do more to minimize lransaelion cosls compared to the altemalive forms.
Ifcounlertradc does nol appcar lo minimize lransaclion cosls. i.e. if il is less eflicienllhan hierarchy or nwrkel conlracling. why do firms go in for il'! Whal is lhe value 01' such agreemenls'! How. in some inslances. do lhey compensale for higher lransaclion eosls? The answer is connccled wilh lhl' value 01' having a "hoslagc" in markels undcr asyrnrnelrie information and posscssing lhe dynarnic c1crncnls 01' counlerlrade agrecmenls. as ¡t way 01' allaining fulure frecdorn 01' choicc in unprcdiclable or changing environmcnls.
Mosl failures lo expbin counlertradc may rcsult from a misconceplion aboullhe forms il may lakc. Hcnnarl ( 19!N. p. 14X). for instancc. argucd lhat lhe various forms 01' CT arc aggrcgated bolh in theoretical diseussion and in cmpirical work. ahhough in facl each one deserves an explanalion on il own merits. Counlertrade agrccmenls indude lransaclions 01' very different kinds. some 01' lhem wilh barter-likc characteristics such as (i) simple barter. swilCh lrading and dearing arrangemenls. which may be a response lo foreign cxchangc shortages or asymmctric informalion problems. whilc (ji) othcr countertrade forms (e.g. buy-back. eountcrpurchase and cornpensationl. can be regarded under ecrlain circurnslances as a ralional response to markct imperfections -as a second-besl oplion in a second-beSl world econorny.
Although sorne specific ex-anle transaclion cc>sts may be high (searching. negotiating). the expo.\'1 (bonding) cffecls and the eonscqucnc:cs 01' executing lhe conlract are of ehief inlerest here.
The problem in inlernational lrade is oflen thal the quality 01' the goods is eilher not observed by an outsider. or can only be verified al considerable eosl. so lhal il cannol be specified unambiguously in a eonlract. The CT contract is designed in sueh a way lhat goods serve as deal-specific°T he n!>servalions come frum .In examinalion uf scver;¡1 case sludies of cOll1plex lrade agreemenls by L1erena el U/o (1991) .
collateral, and their value depends of the quality decision. Countertrade can provide an efficiency-enhancing way of dealing with problems of moral hazard in international trade, since the tying together of two transactions creates a "'hostage" (Williamson. 1983 ) which may deter cheating on quality or defaulting on the payment of the original export.* Commitment to the exchange is signalled more definitely by the willingness of the parties to accept reciprocal goods transactions. Reciprocity can serve to equalize the exposure of the parties. thereby reducing the incentive of one party to defect from the exchange, leaving the other to redeploy specialized assets at greatly reduced alternative value. Defection hazards are thereby reduced, giving the partner an incentive to fulfil its financial obligations.+ Countertrade creates a double moral-hazard situation, and is more likely to provide an efficient institution, the higher the gains from consecutive trades (Williamson. 1983) .
Williamson views the firm as one of a set of possible institutional relationships structured in order to reduce the hazards of idiosyncratic bargaining that inevitably arise in various "small number" circumstances, such as asset-specificity and long-term contracts. While both bounded rationality and opportunism present difficulties, they do not necessarily lead to market failures. since markets represent "'large number" conditions: there are many potential buyers and sellers of goods which are interchangeable, the market signals the appropriate price. "Small number" conditions are much more hazardous. Where the pool of potential transactors is limited, one party can gain the advantage. Where the exchanged assets are no longer obtainable from multiple sources, but are unique, tension can be expected between buyers and sellers. If the seller has no alternative customer fi,r the product, he may be constrained to accept a price from the buyer which is not adcquatcly cotnpcnsated. Similarly. the purchaser may be dependent on the supplier of a unique or scarce asset, and significant costs and delays may be incurred if the desired good is to bc obtained from an altcrn:ttivc supplicr. Similar dynamics of mutual dependency can be observed in long-term countertrade relationships.
Another assumption is ixnportant here, namely opportunism. If there is no opportunism, good laith and mutual adjustment can bc used for coordination purposes, and safeguards will be superfluotts under these circumstances. Not all situations :rod individuals, however, are opportunistic to the s:tmc degree, "'some individuals are opp~,rtunistic and [...I differential trustworthiness is rarely transparent ex-a,te. As :t consequence, ex-ante screening efforts are made and ex-post saleguards are created'" (Williamson, 1985 p. 64 
From the production point of view, the idea of an organization without boundaries implies the coordination of relations with suppliers and customers by assuming an integrated view of the systenn. The development of institutional trade agreements, such as countertrade, will thus help to reduce the risk of opportunism. Under these circumstances, buy-back, counterpurchase and other compensation agrcements can be seen as attempts to reduce transaction costs by providing what amounts to a bond or hostage.
In CT costs are usually highly specific to the tr:msaction, and have two attributes: they are incurred in advance of the contemplated exchange, and their value in alternative uses or by alternative users is greatly reduced (Klein et al.. 1990 used the term "'appropriable quasi-rent'" to *The crucial a.ss, umptitm underlying the analysis presented in this article is that. as assets become more specific and appropriable, quasi-rents are created (thus increasing the t'x)ssiblc gains from opl~)rtunistic behaviour), the costs ()f market ctmtracting will gener;dly increase more than the costs of ccmntertrading. 1""Reputation theory" suggests that a country, will n()t repudiate its debt. if it would otherwise risk its future participation in the internatit)nal trade and financial markets. :~Quoted by No()rderhaven ( 1995. p, .$7) . collatera). and lheir value depends 01' the qualilY decision. Countertrade can provide an efficiency-enhancing way 01' dealing wilh problems 01' moral hazard in intemational trade. since the tying together 01' two transactions creates a "hostage" (Williamson. 19S3) which may deter cheating on quality or defaulting on the payment 01' the original exporto * Commitment to the exchange is signalled more definilely by the willingness 01' the parties to accept reciprocal goods transactions. Reciprocity can serve to equalize the exposure 01' the partieso thereby reducing the incentive 01' one party to defect from the exchange. leaving the other to redeploy specialized assels at greatly reduced altemative value. Defection hazards are thereby reduced. giving the partner an in~:entive to fulfil its financial obligations. t Countertrade creates a double moral-hazard situation. and is more likely to provide an efficient institution. the higher the gains from consecutive trades (Williamson. 1983 l.
Williamson views the tirm as one 01' a set 01' possible institutional relationships structured in order to reduce the hazards 01' idiosyncratic b'lrgaining that inevitably arise in various "small numbcr" circumstances. such as asset-specificity and long-term contracts. While both bounded rationality and opportunism present difticulties. they do not necessarily lead to market failures. since markels represent "Iarge number" condilions: there are many pOlenlial buyers and sellers 01' goods which are inlerchangeablc: the market signals lhe appropriale price. "Small numbcr" condilions are much more hazardous. Where lhe pool 01' polenlial transactors is limited. one party can gain the advantage. Where lhe exchanged assels are no longer obtainable from multiple sources. but are unique. lension can be expecled belween buyers and sellers. 11' the seller has no altemative customer for the prOllucl. he may he conslr<tined 10 accepl a price from the buyer which is not adequalely compensaled. Similarly. lhe purl-haser may oc dependent on the supplier 01' a unique or scarce assel. and significanl cosls and dclays may oc incurred if lhe desired good is to oe ohlained from an alternaliw supplier. Similar dyn.ullics 01' mulual dependency can be ohserwd in long-term counlerlrade rcl.ltionships.
Anolher assumplion is importanl here. namcly opportunism. 11' there is no opportunism. good failh and mutual adjustl1lenl can he used for coordination purposes. and safeguards will be superl1ulllas under lhese circumslances. Nol <111 silualions and individuals. however. are opportunistic From lhe production point 01' view, the idea 01' an organization withoul boundaries implies the coordination 01' re1<ltions with suppliers and cus!Omers by assuming an integr<tled view 01' the systemo The developmenl 01' inslilulional lrade agreements, such as counlertrade. will thus help to reduce Ihe risk 01' opporlunism. Under lhese circumslances. buy-back, counterpurchase and other compensation agreements can be seen as allempls lo redlll:e transaetion costs by providing what amounls to a bond or host.lge.
In CT costs are usually highly specilic to the transaclion. and have two attributes: they are incurred in advance 01' the conlemplaled exchangc. and thcir value in altcrnalive uses or by alter- describe this condition). Reciprocity in these circumstances is thus a device whereby the continuity of a specific trading relation is promoted, white also reducing risk. In the absence of a "hostage" or some other assurance that the other party will not defect, the sale may never materialize. Thus, barter may be an "inefficient" form of trade, not because of the absence of a "'double coincidence of wants" but as a result of asymmetric information and market inefficiencies. Although we explore one particular cost of using the market system --namely the possibility of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour m another key dimension in this context is asset specificity, which refers to "the dependence created through transaction-specific investments. It expresses the amount of value involved in the exchange as such. This value arises from the parties having made investments in the exchange, and from the cost that would be incurred through ending the relation and choosing another exchange party. The second dimension is uncertainty. inherent in situations in which bounded rationality makes humans incapable of predicting the future. The third dimension is frequency, referring to how often the transaction occurs'" (Collin and Larsson. 1993, p. 4) .
At this stage we are able to analyse the limitations of transaction-cost explanations in the case of countertrade agreements. Countertrade seems to suffer high transaction costs, partly because of its neglect of the flexibility aspects. The nature of the flexibility considered will be crucial to our analysis. Indeed. in economic theory it is usually considered that flexibility is a market characteristic: market mechanisms insure a certain kind of flexibility (through price and/or quantity adjustments), mainly in terms of resource allocation. Hierarchies, on the contrary, are supposed to be "'rigid". Rigidities are the result of bureaucratization and arc centralized decision processes, and linked to the size and complexity of the hierarchy.
Flexibility is an ubiquitous and rather ambiguous concept. The kind of flexibility we are talking about must be clearly distinguished from the alhvcative mechanistic adjustment properties genendly attributed to market transactions. We do not argue that countertrade agreements arc more flexible than market transactions, but that they have some of the properties of market adjustmont, like the ability to change partners or dissolve the relationship in case of opportunistic bchaviour.* The transaction-costs approach is essentially a comparatively static one: the institutional analysis assumes instantaneous optin|ization of the institutional form according to a specified set of determinants ~ for instance, the degree of asset-specificity ~ and the process of shifting from one particular form to another is not analysed. In this context a hybrid arrangement permits a more appropriate approach to organizational altermttives: barter and barter-like agreements may then appear as intermediate h~rms, more flexible than hierarchies but less th;m markets.
Other countertrade arrangements can instead be used as devices for reducing the high transaction costs, which affect three types of international transactions in particular, namely the purchase of poorly protected technology, the sale of intermediate products under small-number conditions, and the purchase of marketing services when the distributor has to make up-front transaction-specific investments in countries with restrictions on incoming FDI.
A firm motivated by a desire to integrate horizontally or vertically, or to benefit from firmspecific advantages, would want to put its capital and technology to use in production abroad. However. due to high proprietary costs and political constraints it may be prevented from *Opportunistic behaviour has been identified and discussed in modem anal)~is of the organization of economic activity. . for example, has referred to the effects on the contracting process of" "ex-poxt small numbers opportunism". describe this condition). Reciprocity in these cireumstances is thus a device whereby the continuity of a specific trading relation is promoted. white also reducing risl" In the absence of a "hostage" or sorne other assurance that the other party will not defecto the sale may never materialize. Thus. barter may be an "inefficient" form of trade. not because of the absence of a "double coincidence of wants" but as a result of asymmetric information and market inefficiencies.
Although we explore one particular cost of using the market system -namely the possibility of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour -another key dimension ín this context is asset specificity. which refers to "the dependence created through transaction-specific investments. lt expresses the amount of value involved in the exchange as such. This value arises from the parties having made investments in the exchange. and from the cost that would be incurred through ending the relation and choosing another exchange party. The second dimension is uncertaínty. inherent in sítuations in which bounded rationality makes humans incapable of predicting the future. The third dimension is frequency. referring to how often the transaction occurs" (Collin and Larsson. 1993. p. 4) .
At this stage we are able to analyse the limitations of transaction-cost explanations in the case of countertrade agreements. Countertrade seems to suffer high transaction costs. partly because of its neglect of the flexibility aspects. The nature of the flexibility considered wíll be crucial to our analysis. lndeed. in economic theory it is usually considered that flexibility is a market characteristíc: market mechanisms insure a certain kind of flexíbility (through price and/or quantity adjustments). mainly in terms of resource allocation. Hierarchies. on the contrary. are supposed to be "rigid". Rigidities are the result of bureaucratizatíon and are centralized decision processes. and Iinked to the sizc and complexity of Ihe hierarchy.
Flexibility is an ubiquitous and rather ambiguous cOI1l:ept. The kind of flexibility we are talking about must be c1early distínguished from Ihe ullocative mechanislic adjustment properties generully altribuled to market transaclions. We do not argue that countertrade agreernenls are more flexible than market transactions. but that they huye sorne 01' the properties 01' murkel adjustment. like the ability to change partners or dissolve the rclationship in case 01' opporlunistic bchaviour. *
The transaction-costs approach is cssentially a cornparalively static one: the institutional analysis assumes instantaneous optimizution 01' the institutional foml according to a specilied set 01' deterlllinants -for instam:e. Ihe degree 01' asset-specilicily -and lhe process 01' shifting from one particular form lo another is not analysed. In lhis context a hybrid arrangement pcrmils a more appropri~te approach to organizational alternatives: barter and baner-like agreernents may then appear as inlermediale forms. more flexible than hierarchies bul less than murkets.
Olher countertrade arrangemcnts can instead be used as devices for reducing the high transaction costs. which aITect three types 01' international transactions in panicular. namely the purchase of poorly protected teehnology, the sale of intermedíale products under small-number conditions. and the purchasc of marketing services when the dislribulOr has 10 make up-front transaction-specilic investmenls in countries with restrictions on incoming FDI.
A tirm molivated by a desire to integrate horizontally or vertically, or 10 benctit from tirmspecitic advantages. would want to put its c¡¡pital ano lechnology to use in produclion abroad. However, due to high proprietary costs and political constraints il may be prcvenled from assuming ownership. In this situation the imperfections in the markets for capital and technology are not overcome by internalization, which leads to a divergence between the economic interests of the user and supplier of capital and technology. This problem is aggravated by the information asymmetry between the user and the supplier, and by the absence of future commodity markets in many countries and goods.
The main alternative to vertical integration as a solution to the general problem of opportunistic behaviour is some form of economically enforceable long-term contract, such as a countertrade agreement. Clearly a short-term (i.e. one transaction, non-repeat spot sale) contract will not solve the problem (Klein et al., 1990) . The relevant question then concerns when the vertical integration, the market contracting or the countertrade transactions will occur. We will attempt to make a distinction between a non-price long-term contract like countertrade, and ownership, or market contracting.
Non-price long-term contracts used as an alternative to market contracting or vertical integration can be assumed to assume one of two forms: (i) an explicitly stated contractual guarantee legally enforced by the government or some other outside institution: or (ii) an implicit contractual guarantee enforced by the market mechanism of withdrawing future business is opportunistic behaviour occurs.
Explicit long-term contracts can in principle solve opportunistic problems but, as we have already suggested, the solutions are very costly. Contractual provisions specifying compulsory arbitration or more directly imposing costs on the opportunistic party (for example, via bonding) are alternatives often employed to cut down on litigation costs and to create flexibility without specifying every possible contingency and quality dimension of the transaction.
Such countertradc agreements thus arise as a rational economic solution to market imperfections caused by high ownership costs (or ownership constraints) and information asymmetry. This means that most of these alternative institutional forms for countertrade can be ascribed features which lie between those of the market and those of the hierarchy. Buy-back, for instance, involves a class of international transaction that can be viewed as the vertical or horizontal integration of economic activities while retaining separate ownership, whereas offset has been used in government-related contracts (fighter aircraft, military supplies, etc.) largely in response to political factors.
The analysis has two important implications: first, since a significant percentage of countertrade transactions have little to do with foreign exchange shortages, changes in the debt situation of less-developed countries should have only a moderate impact on the development of countertrade. Second, the future of counterpurchase, compensation and buy-back depends ion restrictions on FD1 on the part of the host countries.
Since buy-back, compensation and counterpurchase agreements probably make up more than half of all countertrade transactions, the countertrade intensity with a country should be correlated with the degree to which it restricts incoming FDI. The empirical evidence generally confirms these observations (Hennart, 1989, p. 147) . On this point the analysis links countertrade to existing theories of FDI.
Countertrade can also be seen as a device for reducing the cost of arranging for the international marketing of products. There is clear evidence that countries imposing counterpurchase requirements do so in order to diversify their exports. There are two ways in which manufacturing and overseas distributions can be integrated. Manufacturers in the home market can establish sales subsidiaries overseas, or firms with developed distribution systems in the home market can establish production facilities in foreign countries. assurning ownership. In this situation the irnperfections in the markets for capital and technology are not overcome by intemalization. which leads to a divergence between the economic interests of the user and supplier of capital and technology. This problem is aggravated by the information asymmetry between the user and the supplier. and by the absence of future commodity markets in many countries and goods.
The main altemative to vertical integration as a solution to the general problem of opportunistic behaviour is sorne form of economically enforceable long-term contracto such as a countertrade agreement. Clearly a short-term (i.e. one transaction. non-repeat spot sale) contract will not solve the problern (Klein et al.• 1990) . The relevant question then concems when the vertical integration. the market contracting or the countertrade transactions will occur. We will attempt to make a distinction between a non-price long-term contract like countertrade. and ownership, or market contracting.
Non-price long-term contracts used as an alternative to market contracting or vertical integration can be assumed to assume one of two forms: (i) an explicitly stated contractual guarantee legally enforced by the government or sorne other outside institution; or (ii) an implicit contractual guarantee enforced by the market mechanism of withdrawing future business is opportunistic behaviour occurs.
Explicit long-term contracts can in principIe solve opportunistic problems but, as we have already suggested. the solutions are very costly. Contractual provisions specifying compulsory arbitrution or more directly imposing costs on the opportunistic party (for example. via bonding) are altematives often employed to cut down on litigation costs and to create tlcxibility without specifying evcry possiblc contingcncy and quality dimcnsion of the transaction.
Such countertradc agrecments thus arise as a rational economic solution to markct imperfections caused by high ownership costs (or ownership eonstraints) and information asymmetry. This means that most of these alternative institutional fúrms fiJr countcrtradc can be aseribed features which Iie betwecn those ofthe market and those ofthe hierarchy. Buy-baek. for instance. involves a c\ass 01' international transaction that can be viewed as the vertical or horizontal integration of econol1lic activilies while ret¡lÍning separale ownership. whereas offset has becn used in governmcnt-related contracts (fighter aircraft. military supplics. etc.) largely in response to political factors.
The analysis has two important implications: first. since a significant pcrcentage of countertrade transaclions have little to do with foreign exchangc shortages, changes in the debt situation of less-dcveloped countries should have only a moderate impact on the development of eountertrade. Second. the future of counterpurchasc, compensation and buy-back depends ion restrictions on FDl on the part of the host countries.
Since buy-back. compensation and counterpurehase agreements probably make up more than hall' of all eountertrade transaetions. the eountertrade intensity with a country should be correlaled with the degree to which it restricts incoming FDI. The empirieal evidence generally contirms these observations (Hennart. 1989. p. 147) . On this point the analysis links countertrade to existing theories of FDI.
Countertrade can also be seen as a device for redueing the cost of arranging for the international marketing of products. There is clear evidence that countries imposing counterpun:hase requirements do so in order to diversify their exports. There are lwo ways in which manufacturing and overseas distributions can be integrated. Manufacturers in the home market can establish sales subsidiaries overseas. or fimls with devclopcd distribution systems in the home market can establish production facilities in foreign countries.
Distribution services are also subject to market failure. First, there is often a small number of potential suppliers of distribution services. Second, there is substantial up-front investment to be made in developing distribution structures, which gives rise to a specific asset. Finally. distributors have local knowledge (about their territories), on which it is difficult to set as price.
In addition, producers may feel uncomfortable with export partners who have access to sources of information unavailable to them selves (asymmetric information), who do not necessarily enjoy the best reputation (perhaps due to past opportunism), or who are operating in a business environment where reliance on export intermediaries may not have been traditionally encouraged, in general, and particularly not by government (atmosphere).
In order to explain the nature of the agreements as stable strategies, we use the notion of organizational flexibility, based on the activation of learning activities between the countertrade partners, which the transaction-costs explanations failed to consider. Such agreements are thus a response related to the value of the dynamic elements of countertrade agreements, as a means of learning and enhancing one's future freedom of choice in unpredictable or changing environments. Countertrade then. can be considered as a routine process for creating complex agreements, constituting a particular kind of institutional trading form.
Even if reciprocal trade agreements suffer high ex-ante transaction costs due to the lengthy negotiations, the traditional approach to CT --because of its neglect of the dynamic aspects a is unable to explain the positive value of such agreements. This line of thought thus suggests that barter and barter-like trading agreements will be useful in situations where due to information asymmetry, high transaction costs would otherwise prevent international trade from taking place: other countertradc forms such as buy-back, compensation and counterpurchase, on the other hand, will be used to avoid restrictions on exports and to deal with the problem of moral hazard when host countries have restrictions on FDI.
in conclusion, thee seems to be evidence that although the negotiation costs of countertrade agreements are often high. such complex contracts may --in terms of efficiency gains and organizational tlexibility, and in the absence of equity links --a second-best answer to the problems of marketing and investing in foreign markets. The analysis of countertrade has thus progressed from a simple situation of double coincidence of wants, to a double coincidence of information scarcity. It is not then necessarily an inefficient form of trade, nor is it inevitably a reflection of a shortage of tbreign exchange; countertrade is simply a substitute for other more standard forms of market trade or internalization.
THE CHOICE OF STRATEGIC TRADING FORM
Countertrade arrangements represent only one of the options available to the exporter for market entry or the maintenance of market shares. There are other alternatives such as licensing, plant delivery, co-production, subcontracting, joint-venture, joint tendering and bilateral or tripartite governance forms (see Casson, 1988 or Hennart, 1988) . China is an obvious example, where buy-back agreements have recently been declining with the enactment of joint-venture regulations. Some countertrade forms can then be seen as a hybrid of joint venture, franchising, vertical integration and FDI under political and ownership constraints.
The organizational decision to establish a countertrade transaction can be more usefully envisaged as a set of sub-decisions, including (i) where to locate various stages of production~ (ii) where to locate the boundary between the firm and the exterior; and (iii) whether the organizational boundary should be hard (market-contracting) or soft (internalization). For a host Dístributíon servíces are also subject to market failure. Fírst. there ís often a small number of potentíal supplíers of dístributíon servíces. Second. there ís substantíal up-front ínvestment to be made in developing distribution structures. which gives rise to a specific asset. Finally. distributors have local knowledge (about their territories). on which ir is difficult to set as price.
In additioo. producers may feel uncomfortable with export partners who have access ro sources of information unavailable to them selves (asymmetric information). who do not necessarily enjoy the best reputation (perhaps due to past opportunism). or who are operating in a business environment where reliance 00 export intermediaries may not have been traditionally encouraged. in general. and particularly not by government (atmosphere).
In order to explain the nature of the agreements as stable strategies. we use rhe notion of organizational flexibilíty. based on the activation of leaming acrivities hetween the countertrade partners. which the transaction-costs explanations failed to considero Such agreements are thus a response related to the value of the dynamic elements of countertrade agreements. as a means of leaming and enhancing one's future freedom of choice in unpredictable or changing environmenrs. Countertrade then. can be considered as a routine process for creating complex agreements. constituting a particular kind of instirutional trading formo Even if reciprocar trade agreements suffer high ex-ante transaction costs due to the lengthy ncgotiations. the traditional approach to CT -bccause of ils neglect of the dynamic aspectsis unable to explain lhe posilive value of such agreemenrs. This line of thought thus suggests lhat barter and barter-like lrading agreements wiJl be useful in situations where due to information asymmetry. high transaction costs would otherwise prevent intemalional trade from laking place; olher counlertrade forms such as buy-back. compensalion and counterpurchase. on the other hand. wiJl be used to avoid restriclions on exports and to deal wilh the problem of moral hazard whcn host counlríes have restrictions on FDI.
In conclusion. thee sccms lo be evidence lhat although the negotiation costs 01' countertrade agrecmenls are oftcn high. such complcx contracls may -in ternlS 01' eftíciency gaios and organizalionalllexibility. and in lhc absence of equity links -a second-best answer to lhc problems of marketing and investing in forcign markcts. Thc analysis of counlcrtradc has thus progressed from a simplc siluation of double coincidcnce 01' wants. to a double coincidcnce of information S¡;an:ily. It is not then nc¡;essarily an inefticient form 01' trade. nor is il incvilably a reflectioo 01' a shortage of foreign exchange; counlenrade is simply a subSlilulc for olher more slandard forms 01' markct lrade or inlernalization.
THE CHOICE OF STRATEGIC TRADING FüRM
Counterlrade arrangements represent only one of the oplions available to the exporter for market entry or the mainlenance of markel shares. There are olher allernatives such as licensing. plant delivery. co-produclion. subcontracling. joint-venlure. joint lendering and bilateral or tripanite govemance forms (see Casson. 1988 or Hennart. 1988) . China is an obvious example. where buy-back agreements have receolly been declining with the enaclment of joint-venture regulalions. Some countertrade forms can thcn bc seen as a hybrid of joint venture. franchising. vertical integration and FDI under polítical and ownership constrainls.
The organizational decision to establish a countertrade transaction can be more usefuJly envisaged as a set of sub-decisions. including (i) where to locate various stages of production; (ii) where to tocate the boundary hetween the firm and the eXlerior; and (iii) whether the organizational boundary should be hard (market-contracting) or soft (intemalization). For a host of environmental and institutional reasons, these boundaries often correspond to national market frontiers in countertrade arrangements.
The decision as to where to locate specific production phases is dictated by locational advantages.* Advantage may be viewed in terms of returns on productive assets. Assets --be they plant, labour, or distribution channels --which are located in economies characterized by comparative advantage, are more favorably priced.
Complex production may involve distributing production phases over different national territories (that is, by using productive assets located in different national territories). This decision corresponds to identifying the national economy which has a comparative advantage during a particular production phase. Alternatively this may be thought of as commanding (through "transactions") the optional set of immobile productive assets. Multinational companies may be particularly adept at identifying which national economy has a comparative advantage in a particular stage of production.
Given that the optional organizational structure frequently requires a transnational distribution of production, the analysis then proceeds to the internalization/market decision. According to Williamson. this involves a comparative analysis of institutional forms, with internalization being favoured where market transaction costs are relatively high (or equivalent, where markets fifil). Similarly, given a transnational distribution of production, internalization in the form of FDI, is preferred where the firms possess firm-specific advantages which they prefer not to alienate, and countertrade is used when these advantages are shared.
The main aspect to emphasize is the reconfiguration of organizational boundaries. The spread of subcontracting and other fornls of interfirm agreements --from joint ventures to strategic alliances --hits developed network form of organization its a third institutional fonu, somewhere half-way between vertical integration and market contracting. A hybrid form of governance is likely to arise, its such a development may be the final outcome of a long process started from the polar premises of make-or-buy decisions .
Hybrid governance, with safeguards, corresponds to bilateral or trilateral governance its described by Williamson (1985 Williamson ( , 1991 . "'These relationships are characterized by high levels of asset specificity and mutual adaptation and [... ] ciln take the I'ornl of complex contracts, specilying arrangements for price and quantity adjustments . . .'" (N(~)rderhaven, 1995. p. 45). International countertrade agreements, we believe, are organizational hybrids, intermediate points on the continuum described by Williamson (I 991) ;rod others, between markets and complete integration (the unitary firm). The organizational decision is more complex than deciding whether a firm purchases a pn)ductive asset (internalization), or its output (market). We describe this more complex decision as an "access decision", in which internalization is only one of a larger set of possibilities.
There are situations in which CT alternatives may be beneficial to partners, because economies can be realized. Let us take the example of a producer of textile machinery who exports to a country like China. If the exporter firm agrees to take payment in the form of textile products (buyback), it may reduce the risk of variability in product quality and delivery schedules (as a result of its own technology and management), and the Chinese may perceive a lower risk of product *In his "'eclectic" approach, Dunning (1988) translates the |lcckshcr-Ohlin notion of comparative advantage, which is an attribute of a national economy, into "'h~:ation:d advantage". Locational advantage is not directly attached to a territory, but rather to certain pnv, luctive assets fixed to that lerritory. The immobility of productive assets (such as lal'~mr) underli,,:s this notion of Iocational advantage.
of environmental and institutional rea..';ons. these boundaries often correspond to national market frontiers in countertrade arrangements.
The decision as to where to locate specific production phases is dictated by locational advantages.* Advantage may be viewed in terrns of returns on productive assets. Assets -be they plant. labour, or distribution channels -which are located in economies characterized by comparative advantage. are more favorably priced.
Complex production may involve distributing production phases over different national territories (that is. by using productive assets located in different national territories). This decision corresponds to identifying the national economy which has a comparative advantage during a particular production phase. Alternatively this may be thought of as commanding (through "transactions") the optional set of immobile productive assets. Multinational companies may be particularly adept at identifying which national economy has a comparative advantagc in a particular stage of production.
Given that the optional organizational structure frequently requires a transnational distribution of production, the analysis then proceeds to the internalization/market decision. According to Williamson, this involves a comparative analysis of institutional forrns. with internalization being favoured where market transaction costs are rclatively high (or equivalent. where markcts fail). Simil¡¡rly. given a transnational distribution of production. internalization in the form of FDI. is prcfcrred where lhe firms possess firm-specific advanlages which they prefer not lo alienate. and countcrtrade is used when these advantages are shared.
The main aspcct lo emphasize is the recontiguration of organizational boundaries. The spread of subcontracling and uther forms of intertirm ¡Ign:eml'nts -from joinl venlures to strategic alliances -has devcloped network form of organizalion as a third instilutional form, somewhere half-way between vertical inlegration ami markct contracting. A hybrid form uf governance is likcly lO arise. as such a devclopment m¡IY be the tinal outcome of a long process started from the polar premises of make-or-buy decisions (Williamson. IlJ75) .
Hybrid governance. with safeguards. corresponds to bilateral or tri lateral govern¡lIlce ¡IS described by Williamson (llJ~5. IlJlJ 1). 'These rclationships are characterized by high levcls of asset speciticity and mutual adaptation amI 1, .. 1can take the rorm of complex contracts. specirying arrangements ror price and quantity adjustmellls ..... (Noorderhaven. Il.) lJ5. p. 45), International countertrade agreements. we bclieve. are urganizational hybrids. intermediate points on the continuum described by Williamson (llJlJ 1) and others. between markcts and complele integralion (lhe unitary firm), The organizational decision is more complex than deciding whether a lirm purchases a productive asset (internalization). or its output (market). We describe this more complex decision as an "access decision". in which internalization is only one of a largcr set of possibilities.
Thcre are situations in which CT aIternatives may be beneficial 10 partners. because economies can be realized. Let us take the cxample of a producer uf textile machinery who cxports to a country likc China. Ir the exporter tirm agrecs to take paymcnt in the form of tcxtile products (buyback). it may reduce the risk of variability in product quality and delivcry schedules (as a result of its own tcchnulogy and management). and the Chinese may perceive a lower risk of product ' In his "~c1cclic" approach. Dunning (19Kll) Iranslalcs lhc Ucckshcr-Ohlin nolion nf comparalivc advamagc. which is an allrihulc nf a nalional ccnnomy. imu "Iocalinnal advanl;lgc", Localinnal advamagc is nnl dircclly auachcd lo a lcrriInry. hUI ralhcr lo ccrtain produclive assels fixcd lo Ihallcrrilory. Thc immnbilily of produclive assels (such as lahour) undcrlics Ihis nolion nf localinnal advanlagc. failure in buying the machinery, since the selling firm will not be "paid" unless the machinery performs to specifications (Rugman and Hodgetts. 1995. p. 168) . Assume. however, that the home country restricts incoming FDI. and is either unable or unwilling to set up marketing networks abroad. Compensation and counterpurchase can serve as the next best route to effective marketing. By telling suppliers that they will import only if the supplier takes back and markets their products, countertraders can force suppliers to undertake marketing investments which they would not otherwise have done. The exporter who is forced to take back the countertrading country's products can be expected to make a greater commitment to nmrketing the goods, because failure to do so would jeopardize his future sales. This is a way of substituting fi~r hierarchical coordination, when the political desire for national sovereignty pushes towards inflows of FDI.
As we have suggested above, each viable form of governance --market, hybrid forms such as countcrtrade, hierarchy --is defined by a series of attributes that bear supporting relations. Among the intermediate forms, countertradc m:ty be a superior structure when it comes to exploiting special tr:tding situations, where (i) the prospect of ntarkct failure ntakes spotcontracting unreliable; (ii) access to assets can be viably shared witht)ut general diffttsion; but where (iii) greater attention must be paid to prc,,;crving economic rents (Atik. 1993) .
A firm mttst obtain access to all the necessary traded assets: "'transactitms'" are the exchanges by which such access is obtained.* The access decision includes (i) whether recourse to the asset is on a spot (market-cash/credit or barter-no ,noncy) or a continuous (contracting) basis, and fttrther, whether (ii) such access is to be exclusive or shared.
Note that the spot/continuous access decision fi~llows Williamson's "fundamental transforntation": where markets function well, spot access is adequate; where markets fail (small ntnnbers) continuous use is preferred in order to reduce opportunisnt. Consider the following rnatrix:
The framework includes two dimensions by which access to traded goods arc obtained. The first dimension expresses whether access to an input/output is on a spot or a long-term continuous basis; this line of analysis is consistent with transaction-cost theory. The second dimension decides whether access to the goods may be shared without destroying economic rents.
Deciding wh:tt forth of countertrade to use fi~r entering up on an international transaction is more complex than the usually proposed decision between firm or market. Barter contracts reached under these circumstances are called spot-market contracts, because they govern goods or services that arc to be exchanged "'on tile spot". For more complex transactions thai extend *ilennart ( I tF)()) distinguishc~, mctht~Jx of organization (price sy~,lem vs. hierarchy ) from instiluti*mal choice. Thus, even when a Ix~lar institutional form is used. a mix of organizational methods will often hc observed. A market transaction will predominantly rely on the price system, but may have hierarchical features O.e. bchavioural controls) as well. failure in buying the machinery. since Ihe selling tinn will nol be "paid" unkss Ihe machinery perfonns lo speciftcalions (Rugman and Hodgetts. 1995. p. 168) .
Assume. however. Ihal Ihe home counlry reslricls incoming FDL and is eilher unable or unwilling lo sel up markeling networks abroad. Compensalion and counterpurchase can serve as Ihe next best roule to effeclive markeling. By telling suppliers Ihal Ihey will import only if Ihe supplier lakes back and markels their products. countertraders can force suppliers to undertake markeling inveslmenls which they would not olherwise have done. The exporter who is forced lo lake back Ihe counlertrading counlry's products can be expecled to make a grealer commilment lo markeling Ihe goods, because failure to do so would jeopardize his fUlure sales. This is a way of subsliluting for hierarchical coordinalion, when Ihe polilical desire for national sovereignlY pushes towards intlows of FDL As we have suggesled above, ea~:h viable form 01' govcrnance -market. hybrid forms such as l..'ounlerlrade. hierarchy -is detined by a series of auribules Ihal bear supporting relalions. Among Ihe ínlermediale fortns, l..'Oltnlerlrade rnay be a superior strul..'lure when il comes lo exploiling spel..'ial Irading silualions, where (il Ihe prospel'l of markel failure makes spoll..'onlral..'ling unrcliable; (ii) access lo assels can be vi¡lhly sh¡lred wilhoul general diffus;on; huI where (iii) grealer aUenlion musl be raíd lo preserving el..'onomic renls (Alik. 1l)l)J l.
A firm musl oblain aCl..'ess lo alllhe necessary Iraded assels; "Iransaclions" are Ihe exchanges by which such al..'l..'ess is oblained. * The ¡Il..'l..'ess del..'ision indudes (i l whelher rel..'lJllrse lo Ihe assel is on a spol (markel-l..'ashkredil or bafler-no llIoney) or a l..'onlinuous (l..'Illllraclíngl basis, and fUflher. whelher (ii l sUl..'h access is lo be exclusive or shared. Nole thal Ihe spot!conlinuous access del..'ision follows Williamson's '"fundamenlallransformal ion": where markels fundion well, spol access is adequale; where markels fail (small numbersl conlinuous use ís prcferrcd in order lo redul..'e 0ppoflunisrn. Consíder lhe following malrix:
The framework includes Iwo dimensions by which access lo Iraded goods are oblained. The lirsl dimension expresses whelher al..'cess lo an input!oulpUl ís on a Spol or a long-Ierm contínuous oasis; Ihis linc 01' analysis is consistcnt wilh Iransal..'lion-cosl thcory. Thc second dimcnsion decides whclher access lo Ihe goods may bc shared wilhoul destroying ewnomic rcnls.
Deciding whal form 01' counlCflradc 10 use for enlering up on an inlernational Iransaction is more complex Ihan the usually proposed decision belween lirm or market. Barrer conlral..'ls real..'hed under Ihesc: circumslances are callc:d spol-markel conlrads, hecause Ihc:y govern goods or services lhal an: lo be c:xdwnged "on Ihe SpOI". For more cornplex Irans¡l\:tions lhal c:xlc:nd over time a relational tbrm of contracting, which does not attempt the impossible task of exclusive contracting but ~ttles instead for an agreement that frames the relationship, other CT forms may be more suitable. Again, continuous access to an asset will be sought where opportunism appears likely to arise: ownership of a productive asset (internalization) or longterm production contracts (buy-back, counterpurehase, etc.) necessarily provides continuous access.
However, there is another important dimension to consider: whether the access to the traded asset is exclusive or may be shared. If the spot versus continuous access decision reflects a minimization of transaction costs, then the shared/exclusive access decision is driven by the desire to preserve imperfect competition. This matrix is thus perhaps more "eclectic" than the more purely transaction-cost explanations (Atik, 1993) .
A firm demands exclusive access to those assets which generate competitive advantages: proprietary technologies are the prime examples of such assets.* Other non-strategic assets may be profitably shared without dissipating rents. Certain goods, however, are best exploited through joint access, where by a limited number of firms share their use but jointly withhold use from all other market participants.t A long-term countertrade contract is thus on the same basis us ownership, providing continuous access to an asset, just as both ownership and long-term contracts suppress the need to bargain over a longer period. On the other hand, barter and barter-type methods, for instance, arise because what appears to be shared use is in fact a spot transaction, with simultaneous exclusive access to the assets for the companies involved. Trade arrangements implying reciprocity can also be used to equalize the exposure of the parties. Other countertrade forms (buy-back. counterpurchase, etc.) represent particular trading arrangements. They occur when (i) access to an asset is to be continuous ; when (ii) shared access is more efficient than exclusive access; but when (iii) countertrade is preferred to the market mechanism.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
One of the most important developments in international trade over the last two decades has been the increase and widespread use of barter-like practices, usually known under the generic name of countertrade. According to economic theory, if money exists as a means of exchange, then given the superiority of money-mediated transactions, barter would be irrational.
Competing theories arise, however, when it comes to explaining reciprocal trade under both perfect and imperfect competition. Several authors have attempted to explain the presence and increasing prevalence of these complex ftwms of international transactions, using the standard ttmls of economic analysis. They show that in many circumstances countertrade is a rational response to transaction costs, information asymmetries, moral hazard/agency problems and other market imperfections, simply representing a substitute for other more standard forms of market trade or internalization aimed at reducing transaction costs under the conditions outlined.
*As Dunning (1988) i~)ints out. the ov,'ncr~hip of an asset is not irrelevant to its value. This makes an explicit link between ownership and kx:ational advantage. tShared use, it seems, can minimize transaction costs in certain circumstances, while simultaneously conversing the economic rents which these specific productive assets generate (Kogut. 1988 . pp. 319-320).
over time a relational form of contracting. whieh does not attempt the impossible task of exclusive contracting but settles instead for an agreement that frames the relationship. other CT forms may be more suitable. Again. continuous access to an asset will be sought where opportunism appears likely to arise: ownership of a productive asset (internalization) or longterm production contracts (buy-baek. counterpurchase. etc.) necessarily provides continuous access.
However. there is another important dimension to consíder: whether the access to the traded asset is exclusive or may be shared. If the spot versus continuous access decision reflects a minimization of transaction costs. then lhe shared/exclusive access decision is driven by the desire to preserve imperfeet competitíon. This malrix is thus perhaps more "eclectic" than the more purely transaction-cost explanations (Atík. 1993).
A firm demands exclusive aceess to lhose assets whích generate eompetitive advantages:
proprietary technologies are the prime examples of sueh assets. * Other non-strategic assets may be profitably shared wilhout dissipaling rents. Certain goods. however. are best exploited through joínt access. where by a limiled number of finns share their use but joinlly withhold use from all olher markct partieipants. t
A long-lero1 counlertrade eonlraet is lhus on lhe same basis us ownershíp. províding eonlinuous aeeess to an assel. jusI as bolh ownership and long-lerm conlracls supprcss lhe need to bargain over a longer periodo On lhe olher hand. barter and bartcr-type melhods. for inslanee. arise beeause what appears to be shared use is in fael a spol transaelion. wilh simultaneous exclusive aeeess lo lhe asseIs for lhe eompanies involved. Trade arrangemenls ímplying reeiproeily can ¡liso be used lo equalize lhe exposure of lhe parties. Olher eounlertmde forms (buy-bm:k. counlcrpun:hase. etc.) represenl particular Irading arrangements. They occur when (i) access lo an assel is lo be conlinuous: when (íi) shared acccss is more eflicient Ihan exclusive access; huI when (iii) eounlertradc is prcferred to thc markel mechanism.
SUMMARY ANO CONCLUOING REMARKS
One of Ihe mosl important dcvclopmcnts in inlernational Irade over Ihe last two decades has been the increase and widespread use of barler-like practices. usually known under the generic name of countertrade. According to economic thcory. if moncy exisls as a means of exchange. then given the superiority of money-medialed lransaclíons. barter would be irrational.
Compeling theories arise. however. when il eomes lo explaining recíprocal trade under both perfeet and impcrfect compelition. Several aulhors have attempted lo explain lhe presenee and íncreasing prevalence of lhese complex forms of inlernalional transactíons, using the standard tools of economic analysis. They show Ihal ín many circumstances countertrade is a rational response lo lransaction cosls. informalion asymrnelries. moral hazard/agency problems and other markel írnperfections. simply representing a substilule for other more standard forms of market trade or inlernalizalion aimed at reducíng lransaction costs under the conditions outlíned.
"As Dunning (19XX) poinls oul. Ih.: nwn.:rship of an assel is nol irrelevanl lo ils valu.:. This makes an explicil link belween ownership and 1'K:alional advantage. tShared use. il seems, can minimil.e transaelion ensls in eerlain cireumslam:es. while simuhaneously eonversing Ihe eeonomie renls which Ihesc spceifie produetive assels generalc (Kogul. 191111. pp. 319-32()).
In this article we have looked at economic countertrade arrangements from a comparative institutional point of view, whereby cutting down transaction costs is seen as the key feature of this form of strategic trading. We argue that countertrade is not novel: nor is it a mixed case. Rather, it is a distinct type of institutional arrangement. Consequently in the organizational continuum proposed by Williamson it is possible to construct and use a third (hybrid) institutional form which is congruent with transaction-cost theory.
Hence, what distinguishes these complex forms of trading arrangements is the kind of transaction effected (reciprocal trade), and the reason why they can minimize transaction costs more than internalization and market contracting. Each viable form of governance --market, hybrid (countertrade), hierarchy m is defined by a series of attributes that bear a supporting relationship.
This line of thought suggests that barter and barter-like trading agreements will be useful in situations where, due to asymmetric information, high transaction costs would otherwise prevent international trade from taking place. Other forms of countertrade such as buy-back, compensation and counterpurchase on the other hand will be used to avoid restrictions on FDI by host countries. In this context two of the most common forms of countertrade, compensation and counterpurchase, can be explained as attempts to build up reciprocity in order to reduce transaction costs in the international marketplace for intermediate products, technology and distribution services. Reciprocity can also be used to equalize the exposure of the parties in the case of buy-back agreements.
Due to incomplete contracting or the absence of law enforcement, international trade imposes the great risk of opportunistic behaviour on the part of trading partners. Countertradc is supposed to solve the moral-hazard problem by introducing a "hostage", which would be forfeit --at any rate partly --if either party cheats during the first transaction. For this construction to work the hostage has to be sufficiently valuable compared with the possible benefits of cheating.
In order to explain agreements in terms of stable strategies we also developed the concept of organizational flexibility, based on the activation of learning activities between the countertrade partners ~ something which the transaction-cost explanation htiled to consider. The choice of trading h~rm is thus a response related to the value of the dynamic elements ofcountcrtrade agreements as a means of learning and to increase future freedom of choice in unpredictable or changing environments. Countertrade will then be regarded as a routine process of creating complex agreements which constitute an institutional an institutional trading form.
Barter and barter-type transactions can be explained in a framework where by access to the traded goods is on a spot but also an exclusive basis ~ a species of mutually exclusive spot contract in which no money is used. Other countertrade h~rms can be explained instead in that access to an input-output is continuous but can be shared without destroying economic rents.
Nevertbelcss, although "'Considerable progress has been made in the last two years in developing a theory of institutional choice based on the minimization of organizing costs" (Hennart, 1994. p. 193 ), we do not claim to have presented a general theory of countertrade. Rather, we argue that some countertrade forms may often a superior trading structure for exploiting special situations, where (i) the prospect of market failure means that spot contracting is unreliable; where (ii) access to assets can be viably shared without general diffusion; but where (iii) greater attention must be paid to preserving economic rents derived from the benefits of organizational flexibility.
We therefore conclude that under certain circumstances ~ such as asymmetric information, host country restrictions on foreign investment, a rapidly changing environment ~ barter-like agreements and other forms of countertrade can represent a form of that minimizes transaction costs while also conserving the economic rents generated by these specific arrangements.
In this article we have looked at economic countertrade arrangements from a comparative institutional point of view. whereby cutting down transaetion costs is seen as the key feature of this form of strategic trading. We argue that countertrade is not novel; nor is it a mixed case. Rather. it is a distínct type of institutíonal arrangement. Consequently in the organizational contínuum proposed by Williamson it is possible to construet and use a third (hybrid) institutional form which is congruent with transaction-cost theory.
Hence. what distinguishes these complex forms of trading arrangements is the kind of transaction effected (reciprocal tcade), and the reason why they can minimize transaction costs more than intemalization and market eontracting. Each viable form of govemance -market. hybrid (countertrade l. hierarchy -is defined by a series of attributes that bear a supporting relationship.
This line of thought suggests that barter and barter-like trading agreemenls will be useful in situalions where. due lo asymmelric informalion. high lransaction costs would otherwise prevent intemational tcade from taking place. Olher forms of counlertrade sueh as buy-back. compensalion and counlerpurchase on Ihe olher hand will be used lo avoid reslrictions on FDI by hosl counlries. [n Ihis conlexl two of the most common forms of counlertrade. compensalion and counlerpurehase. can be explained as attempts to build up reciprocily in order to reduce transaclion cosls in lhe inlemational marketplace for inlermediate products. technology and distribution services. Reeiprocily can also be used lo equalize the exposure of lhe parties in the case of buy-back agreemenls.
Due to ¡ncomplete contracting or thc abscm:c of law cnforcemcnt, inlemationallrade imposcs lhe greal risk of opportunislic behaviour on lhc part of Irading partners. Counlertradc is supposed to solve lhe moral-hazard problcm by inlroducing a "hoslagc", which would be forfeil -al any rate partly -if either party eheats during thc lirsllransaclion. For Ihis conslruction lo work Ihe hostage has lo be sufficiently valuable compared with lhe possiblc benelits 01' chealing.
In order lo explain agreemenls in lerms of sl:,ble slralegies we also developed Ihe eoncepl of organizalinnal flexibilily. based nn lhe aclivalion nI' learning aClivilics bclween Ihe COUnlertrade partners -something which lhe Iransaclion-cosl explanalion f:\Íled lo considero The choice of lrading form is Ihus a response relaled lo Ihe value of Ihe dynamie elemenls ofcounlerlrade agrecmenls as a mcans of leaming and lo increase fUlure freedom of choice in unprediclable or changing environmenls. Counlertrade will lhen be regarded as a rouline process of crealing complex agrcemenls which conslilule an inslilulional an inslilulional Imding formo Barler and barter-Iype Iransaclions can be explained in a framework wherc by access lo lhe Iraded goods is on a spol bul also an exclusive basis -a species of mUlually exclusive spol conlrael in which no money is used. Olher counlertrade forms can be explained inslead in Ihal access lo an inpul-oulpUI is conlinuous bUI can be shared wilhoul deslroying economie rents.
Nevertheless, although "Considerable progress has been made in the last lwo years in developing a theory of inslitutional choice based on lhe minimizalion of organizing costs" (Hennart, p. 193) . we do nol daim lo have presenled a generallheory of counlertrade. Ralher, we argue Ihal sorne counlertradc forms may often a superior Irading slruclurc for exploiling special silualions. where (i) Ihe prospcct of markel failure means Ihat spot contracting is unreliable; where (ji) access lo assels can be viably shared wilhoUI general diffusion; but whcre (iii) grealer altenlion must be paid lo preserving economic renls derived from Ihe bcnetils of organizalional flexibility.
We therefore condude that under certain circumstances -such as asymmelric informalion, hosl counlry reslriclions on foreign investment. a rapidly changing environmenl -barter-like agreements and olher forms of countcrtrade can represent a form of lhal minimizes lransaction cosls while also conserving Ihe economic renls generaled by Ihese specilic arrangements.
